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Observations on Trade Law and Globalization

SARA DILLON∗

I imagine most people with an interest in the subject have their own
working definition of globalization. My definition goes something like this:
Globalization is at least in part about the spread of mass markets and common
tastes, albeit with variations. International trade law, by reducing the
possibility that individual countries can “prefer” their own productions, is one
of the mechanisms for facilitating the spread of these common tastes.1 I am
by no means implying that the global tastes are elevated ones; in fact, the
mass-appeal products sought might be inferior in many ways to what came
before. The irony of the franchise, for instance, is that better or worse does
not matter—only sameness.2 The important thing is that the tastes are
commonly held across a national-culture-free zone, and recognized as such.
Rather than pursuing the more philosophical question of the
importance of trade and/or globalization, we might consider the importance of
studying international trade law, and how we should study it, as well as how
we are studying it now. I will offer a modest, if stinging critique of how
international trade law seems to have entered the legal academy as a
discipline.
∗

Sara Dillon has a PhD from Stanford University and a JD from Columbia University
Law School. She is Associate Professor at Suffolk University Law School in Boston,
where she teaches International Trade Law, European Union Law, International Law
and International Chidren's Rights.
1
At the most basic level, GATT Article I, General Most-Favored Nation Treatment,
requires participating States to treat the products of all participating trading partners
without discrimination; Article III, National Treatment on Internal Taxation and
Regulation requires these States to treat importing products in the same way they treat
their own domestic products; and Article XI, General Elimination of Quantitative
Restrictions, requires that Member States not to set up quantitative barriers to the
importation of products.
2
See David Leebron, Claims for Harmonization: A Theoretical Framework, 27 Can..
Bus.. L.J. 63, 66 (1996). Leebron argues "the term 'harmonization' is something of a
misnomer insofar as it might be regarded as deriving from the musical notion of
harmony, for it is difference, not sameness, that makes for musical harmony." Id. at
67.
103
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In this regard, one notices in recent years a proliferation of glossy
advertising for interdisciplinary studies, in law as in other fields. But in fact,
international trade law has contentedly taken its place in the pantheon of
hermetically sealed subject matter areas. No idea is so often expressed and so
strenuously avoided as truly interdisciplinary studies. Legal training
particularly encourages a devotion to the decontextualized “dispute.”
Standing ready to win for one’s side is a respected mode of concern; whereas
advocating for law reform is generally considered “fluffy” and “nonrigorous.”
I am struck by the manner in which international trade law has
become a regular feature in law school course offerings, and doubt that this
occurred because of an awakening to its inherent importance to the
curriculum. 3
Rather, I think that there were clear legal/historical
developments that made the inclusion of trade law “all right,” acceptable as a
branch of study, because it came to be seen as sufficiently legal. Given the
fact that international trade law is “here,” I would like in the course of this
article to offer my own prescription for how to revise our pedagogical
approach to it, by endowing the subject, including its disputes, with meaning
and significance, rather than mystifying it in the technical sense.
As a general matter, and with some notable exceptions, there is a
striking and tragic gulf between humanists or “human rights people,” and
those engaged in economic law subjects. As it happens, the courses I teach
represent several universes of concern: international trade, primarily the
World Trade Organization (WTO) and the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), European Union (EU) Law (with everything from free
movement of goods through social policy, the environment, and even war and
peace), as well as the more recent international children’s rights. I like
systems critiques. I like to examine systems—global trade regulation as a
totality, the EU as an architectural construct, or the United Nations (UN)
human rights system, such as it is. For myself, I am certain about whether I
would prefer to be stranded on a desert island with human rights people on the
one hand, or economic lawyers on the other. But be that as it may, in terms of
the construction of global law, or global governance as some like to put it, this
split, this divide, between the thinking of trade specialists and humanistic
lawyers, has become profound, even absurd.

3

A survey of 184 ABA accredited law schools in the United States found that 99 had
at least one course in International Trade. Survey results on file with the author.

2005]

S ARA DILLON

105

Since I am the permanently alienated humanist in the house of
economic law technicians, maybe my own example will shed some light on
the problem. At the same time, as I have become more involved in children’s
rights themes, I am equally impatient with the often sterile focus of human
rights specialists on the UN reporting system. 4 It seems to me that human
rights specialists do not know how to advocate for law reform at global trade
level, because they leave the entire operation to trade law specialists, perhaps
on the assumption that it all looks so hard, they must know what they are
doing, even if what they are doing is quite ill conceived. 5
In one sense, I stumbled into the teaching of trade law, was chosen by
it rather than embracing it as a matter of inclination, but this was
coincidentally at the very point when the WTO was being created. I
remember my Dean at University College Dublin asking whether I couldn’t
just “read the General Agreement on Tarrifs and Trade GATT with them?”
And that I certainly went on to do. You will recall that in 1995, the WTO
came into being and the talk of the town was that the old GATT system was
being replaced by something more legalistic, the so-called judicialization and
legalization of international trade regulation. 6 There was a distinct lawyerly
thrill of pleasure.

4

Unlike the WTO’s dispute resolution mechanism, the UN’s human rights treaty
bodies have no effective enforcement mechanisms, but rely on a reporting system
where States report on their application and compliance with treaty requirements and
a Committee responds to the reports.
5
Though tangentially criticizing the WTO, human rights specialist groups such as
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, who address many trade related
issues such as human trafficking, bonded labor, child labor, etc., have not established
coherent and sustained strategies to advocate that the WTO address trade-related
human rights problems. Bryan Schwartz speculates as to why this might be. He
writes:
“The style of WTO opinions tends to be dry, lawyerly and technical. Those
who write the decisions are no doubt anxious to demonstrate to governments
and the wider public that their decisions are not based on subjective political
values. Rather, the adjudicators involved are anxious to demonstrate that any
conclusions they reach flow inexorably from the application of logic to the
precise words of the trade provision at issue.”
Bryan Schwartz, Lawyers and the Energing World Constitution, 1 Asper Rev. Int'l
Bus. & Trade L. 1, 7 (2001). He calls this tendency "seeking legitimacy through
technicality." Id.
6
Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, arts. XI, XII,
Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994)
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The old GATT system, dating from the immediate postwar period,
was based on non-discrimination and anti-protectionist principles.7 Disputes
were resolved under an essentially diplomatic regime; the conclusions of the
panel hearing the dispute could be blocked by the losing nation, thus evading
the full legal implications of such a ruling. 8 Panels were ad hoc bodies of
trade specialists, put together for the purpose of hearing a particular dispute.
It seems safe to say that the public imagination was not frequently gripped by
the doings at “the GATT,” except perhaps at moments like the handing down
of the Tuna Dolphin panel report.9
But in 1995, there was legal excitement for a number of reasons. An
enforceable dispute resolution mechanism in the form of a Dispute Settlement
Understanding was created; in addition to the ad hoc panels, there would also
be an appellate layer of review in the form of the Appellate Body, permanent
and to that extent “court-like.”10 In addition to the development of
enforcement mechanisms, there were also many new areas of substantive
trade law brought into the mix, to which all WTO member countries would
[hereinafter WTO Agreement] (requiring all ratifying Members to accept agreements
settled at the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations). Between 1986 and 1994, the
negotiators at the Uruguay Round created an intergovernmental organization (the
WTO) that would enshrine the principles of the previous General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (the GATT) relating to the trade in goods while adding agreements
on trade in services, trade-related intellectual property, dispute settlement, and other
supplemental agreements. See generally Raj Bhala & Kevin Kennedy, World Trade
Law 8-15 (2d ed.) (2000) (explaining WTO's creation and mandate).
7
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature, Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
8
Patrick M. Moore, Current Development: The Decisions Bridging the GATT 1947
and the WTO Agreement, 90 Am. J. Int’l L. 317, 319 (1996).
9
United States – Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada
(Tuna/Dolphin I), Feb. 22, 1982, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.), para. 4.8 (1982) ;
United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Tuna/Dolphin II), Aug. 16, 1991,
GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) para. 5.26 (1993), reprinted in 30 ILM 1594 (1991).
10
Dispute Settlement Understanding, WTO Agreement, supra note 6, arts. 4-6,
Annex 2 [hereinafter DSU] (outlining procedures for WTO Members attempting to
resolve complaints). DSU Article 4 encourages Members to first attempt to come to a
mutual settlement of their dispute through good faith consultations. Id. art. 4. DSU
Article 5 allows Members to voluntarily submit their dispute to conciliation and
mediation by the WTO. Id. art. 5. DSU Article 6 permits the complaining Member to
request the establishment of a WTO Panel, composed of individuals from a list of
experienced practitioners, to settle the dispute. Id. art. 6. DSU Article 17 establishes a
permanent WTO Appellate Body to hear appeals from Panel decisions. Id. art. 17.
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have to adhere, notably Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS), Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and the Services Agreement. The Safeguards,
Anti-Dumping and Subsidies Agreements placed greater discipline on the use
of self-protective measures by national governments.11 Seen as a package, the
Uruguay Round results brought global trade regulation, that dull-sounding
creature, into the informed public ’s consciousness.
At least part of the reason for this flurry of attention was that this
was…well, law. It could be studied as other types of “real law” were studied.
It was not aspirational or platitudinous in the manner of UN-centric human
rights “law,” it was not simply soft law.12 Participating countries (more or
less everyone, with several notable exceptions) had agreed, really agreed, to
either offer compensation or accept the legitimacy of trade sanctions against
them in the event of losing a dispute—the sanctions of course being imposed
by the prevailing party. 13 While the Appellate Body was not strictly bound to
adhere to its own pronouncements, decisions of the new and permanent
Appellate Body felt important. They had global persuasive value; the whole
system seemed to take on a concreteness and predictability unusual in
international law. One’s students might still whine, “But what happens if a
country doesn’t go along with it?” but legal system it nevertheless appeared
now to be. 14 This question may still be raised, but so far, genuine crises have
been avoided—crises such as this: Country X will not accept this ruling and
rejects the WTO as a forum for adjudication.

11

WTO Agreement, supra note 6, annex 1A.
The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) creates a legalistic dispute
settlement system, leading to rulings by an ad hoc panel and an Appellate Body,
which, after adoption by the DSB, have binding effects on the disputing Member
States and may lead to significant costs if disregarded by a loser. This could take the
form of retaliatory tariffs placed on products of the “losing” country by the prevailing
party. WTO Dispute Resolution Understanding, supra note 6, annex 2 [hereinafter
DSU].
13
DSU, supra note 12, arts. 21 & 22.
14
There have been examples of a Member State not complying with Appellate Body
reports, particularly the European Union’s non-compliance in the Bananas and Beef
Hormones cases. See Benjamin L. Brimeyer, Bananas, Beef, and Compliance in the
World Trade Organization: The Inability of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process to
Achieve Compliance from Superpower Nations, 10 Minn. J. Global Trade 133 (2001)
[hereinafter Brimeyer].
12
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For different reasons, even now I also find the concept of true
international legality suggestive to the point of thrilling, but only to the extent
that the principle can at some point in the future be applied to other areas of
human concern than trade law. At its inception, there was very little
articulated about the political goals of the new WTO. Ten years on, the
question of overarching objectives has, if anything, become even more muted
over time.15 The post-World War II GATT system, like the European
Community (EC), was created to ensure international peace and stability, on
the theory that economic integration facilitates peaceful co-existence.16 It was
unclear what role “war and peace issues” played in the Uruguay Round,
where the emphasis was rather on billions and trillions in wealth being created
in the near term, with that great cheerleader for all that is good, Peter
Sutherland, finding himself very much the right man at the right time. 17
Because the EU does not merely rely on a shared sense of wealth
creation, efficiency and improved economic growth, the EU is
correspondingly more complex and complete. We are witnessing a moment
of historical intensification in that regard, in that the new European
Constitution will go far beyond ideas of a common market to fully embrace an
EU mandate for human rights, and global security, in which the EU will
participate on a newly coherent and unified basis—or so the myth of the
“constitutional treaty” goes.18 If nothing else, the EU will have the capacity

15

The Doha Development Agenda was established to set objectives for multilateral
agreements that would accelerate economic development for developing countries,
particularly with regard to agricultural policies but also including, investment,
environment, and competition policy. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial
Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002). At
the subsequent Ministerial Meeting in Cancun, however, these negotiations collapsed
when over twenty developing countries walked out in protest to the unwillingness of
the US and EU to give adequate concessions regarding agriculture. See Clete D.
Johnson, A Barren Harvest for the Developing World? Presidential "Trade
Promotion Authority" and the Unfulfilled Promise of Agriculture Negotiations in the
Doha Round, 32 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 437 (2004).
16
See John H. Jackson, The Boundaries of the WTO: Afterword: The Linkage
Problem--Comments on Five Texts, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 118, 121-22 (2002).
17
Michael H. Davis & Dana Neacsu, Legitimacy, Globally: The Incoherence of Free
Trade Practice, Global Economics and Their Governing Principles of Political
Economy, 69 UMKC L. Rev. 733, 757 (2001)
18
See the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe and accompanying
materials, at http://european-convention.eu.int.
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to become more nearly than ever before the federal superstate of Europhile
vision and Euroskeptic nightmare.19
But the WTO presented itself as a different sort of animal, as I will
describe. I have suggested elsewhere that if the WTO could be seen as part of
a larger project of global governance, then so far we had only a Department of
Commerce.20 While both systems, the WTO and the EU, have created a
made-for measure language of rationality, at least the EU’s special lingo made
one feel that there was some sort of courtly significance involved. To read the
decisions of the European Court of Justice is to participate in a complex
exercise. To master the language of the WTO exacts a different price from
the pupil. A more frightening prospect is that the hyper-textualism and
thousand- part tests of WTO law exactly suited the newly-minted trade law
specialists, for whom the decontextualized aspect of WTO law was actually
an academic plus.
It has always been my wish that people who hate reading economic
law, including what I consider to be extraordinarily turgid panel and
Appellate Body reports, would embrace these documents with zest. To the
extent that trade law attracts a certain variety of specialist, due to its alien tone
and its inhuman or anti-human characteristics (because so strictly
decontextualized), and to the extent that it attracts people who actually enjoy
the intellectual milieu created by the new subject matter, we are faced with a
global governance challenge, one which I will explore below.
What was the big deal about 1995?
The so-called “Uruguay Round negotiations” spanned the late 1980s
and early 1990s, roughly corresponding to the Single Market program in
19

See Grainne de Burca, The Drafting of a Constitution for the European Union:
Europe's Madisonian Moment or a Moment of Madness?, 61 Wash & Lee L. Rev.
555 (2004); see also Stephen C. Sieberson, The Proposed European Union
Constitution -- Will it Eliminate the EU's Democratic Deficit?, 10 Colum. J. Eur. L.
173 (2004).
20
See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents 22-23 (Norton, 2002).
Stiglitz writes, “we have a system that might be called global governance without
global government, one in which a few institutions - the World Bank, the IMF, the
WTO - and a few players - the finance, commerce and trade ministries, closely linked
to certain financial and commercial interests - dominate the scene, but in which many
of those affected by their decisions are left almost voiceless.” Also cite to my Linkage
article, where I coincidentally expressed a similar thought
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Europe.21 These negotiations resulted in a set of new trade laws that were
adopted according to an all-or-nothing principle thus: if participating
countries wished to join, they would have to accept everything, the “whole
package,” from soup to nuts, including those agreements that might go against
their particular economic or developmental interests.22
In that sense, I see many of the early WTO cases in studies of “tough
luck,” perhaps analogous to early European Community cases where the
European Court of Justice informed resistant Member States that they have
just agreed to an unending, unyielding supranational system, into which they
have poured significant amounts of their sovereignty and constitutional
traditions.23 Resistance is futile, what you had hoped meant is irrelevant,
and—characteristic of WTO law—only the text ultimately counts. (Nothing
could be further from the truth, of course, in EU law.)
21

See generally Sara Dillon, International Trade Law and Economic Law and the
European Union (Hart, 2002) [hereinafter Dillon].
22
Starting with the Uruguay Round accords, countries have had to participate in all of
the negotiated agreements as part of a "single undertaking." This requirement meant
that developing countries had to commit to substantially greater reforms of their trade
barriers and trade practices than they did in the past. In the Uruguay Round, many
countries had to accept obligations developed without their substantial participation,
and which required the implementation and enforcement of regulatory policies that
they have had great difficulty in fulfilling. See Jeffrey J. Schott & Jayashree Watal,
Decision Making in the WTO, in The WTO After Seattle 283, 284-285 (Jeffrey J.
Schott ed., 2000).
23
See, e.g., Case 6/64, Costa v. Ente Nazionale Per L’Energia Elecrica (ENEL), ECR
585 (1964) (“By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own
institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and … more particularly, real
powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the
States to the Community, the Member States have limited their sovereign rights,
albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a body of law which binds both
their nationals and themselves”); Case 106/77, Amministazione Delle Finanze Dello
Stato v. Simmenthal SpA (Simmenthal II), ECR 629 (1978) (“every national court
must, in a case within its jurisdiction, apply Community law in its entirety and protect
rights which the latter confers on individuals and must accordingly set aside any
provision of national law which may conflict with it, whether prior or subsequent to
the Community rule”); Case C-213/89, The Queen v. Secretary of State for Fransport,
ex parte Factortame LTD (Factortame I), ECR I-2433 (1990) (“The full effectiveness
of Community law would be … much impaired if a rule of national law could prevent
a court seized of a dispute governed by Community law from granting interim
relief”); Case 314/85, Firma Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lubeck-ost, ECR 4199
(1987) (holding the European Court of Justice has sole jurisdiction to declare
Community acts invalid).
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One of my personal favorites of the early WTO cases is the “Indian
Pharmaceuticals” case, where India is pounced upon by the United States and
the EC to make sure that it scrupulously adheres to the terms of the transition
to patent protection for pharmaceutical products.24 What interested me so
much at the time the panel and Appellate Body reports came down was that
on issues relating to whether India could live up to the TRIPS Agreement the
reports were silent. On social issues, issues of poverty and impossibility and
national self interest, including conflicting economic imperatives, the reports
had essentially not a word to say. The rulings were based on – or grew out of
– the text of the TRIPS Agreement.25 Context was absent or deemed
irrelevant. How eager we are, by contrast, to invoke context and difficulties
and process when we are speaking of full and immediate implementation of
human rights imperatives!
One could argue, of course, that with the death of GATT a la carte,
there really was nothing outside “the text” to discuss. India had signed up to
the terms of the TRIPS Agreement, so whatever other political concerns it
had, or difficulties, or internal resistance, were no longer relevant, even
though this was a “State to State” law and an international law system. The
panels and the Appellate Body are specialized bodies; they do not deal
seriously with conflicting national laws outside the subject matter of the
“national measure” being challenged, and only to a limited degree other
sectors of international law.26 They do at times give the nod to other (nontrade) treaties, but the Appellate Body has never struck me as analogous to
real courts of law, where it is standard practice to balance and synthesize
various and potentially conflicting principles of law. International trade law,
WTO law, is a technocratic branch of law, but with implications that go far
beyond the technocratic. This disconnect is in many ways tragic.

24

WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical
and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997)
25
WTO Agreement, supra note 5, annex 1C.
26
See Jeffery Atik, Global Trade Issues in the New Millennium: Democratizing the
WTO, 33 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 451, 452 (2001). Atik states: “Although the WTO
is still of recent origin it yields considerable (and unexpected) power. The substantive
terms of its agreements limit the scope of action for national regulation, stripping
power away from states. Its enhanced dispute resolution mimics a form of
hierarchical supremacy: WTO rules act as a super-constitutional text with a force
superior to ordinary national enactments. Once the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
finds that a national measure is inconsistent with a WTO obligation, the WTO
member is expected to bring its law into conformity.” Id.
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There were other early cases that struck me as profoundly important
and interesting, when seen through the prism of trade values opposed to
“other” values. Two of the most instructive battles taking place between the
US and the EC were the Beef Hormones case and the Bananas case.27
Although the EC is happy to use WTO law as a blunt instrument when
necessary, in these cases the EC’s regulatory values were at stake, and the
powerful EC, simply put, lost.28
The Uruguay Round’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)
Agreement, upon which the Beef Hormones case was argued, was a startling
document, in that it placed an explicit burden on countries to justify their food
safety rules, and mystified the idea of “scientific evidence.” Consumer
protection rules that involve additives and pests are difficult enough to
achieve at national level, and despite the kindler, gentler rhetoric of the
Appellate Body to the effect that countries were indeed “free to choose” their
“appropriate” level of protection, as far as I could ever read the agreement and
the decisions taken under it, the bottom line was that without some scientific
basis for a restrictive national regulation, the WTO would have the power to
invalidate it.29
Many might ask, well, what is wrong with that? National regulations
purportedly based on harm to human or animal health must be justified in
scientific terms, or be struck down in the name of free trade. Trade law rules
out only hypochondria, hypersensitivity, and perhaps in the process blots out
historical memory of other times when the populace was told: “it is safe, all
the scientists say so.” The EC attempted to urge a “limits to science”
approach in its Beef Hormones defense.30 The United States has acted on the
same sort of impulse—prove that it is justified or give it up—in its more
27

See WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, AB-1997-4 (Jan. 16, 1998)
[hereinafter Beef Hormones]; WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, European
Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas,
WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997). See also, Terence P. Stewart & David S. Johanson,
The WTO Beef Hormone Dispute: An Analysis of the Appellate Body Decision, 5 U.C.
Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 219 (1999); Hunter R. Clark, The WTO Banana Dispute
Settlement and Its Implications for Trade Relations between the United States and the
European Union, 35 Cornell Int'l L.J. 291 (2002).
28
See Brimeyer, supra note 14; 147-162.
29
WTO Agreement, supra note 5, at annex 1A – Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures .
30
Beef Hormones, supra note 28, paras. 177-180.
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recent challenge to the EU’s reluctance to allow the commercial use of
genetically modified organisms (GMOs).31 Miffed that the EC has not
allowed the release of GMOs under laws that actually do make such
controlled releases possible, the US has again dared the EU to present a
scientific defense where perhaps none truly exists. The point to me is that
public pressure of the “No thank you, just don’t want it” variety, whether or
not it is strictly rational or totally scientific, gets demoted in the regulatory
process.
As mentioned above, these recent cases have their roots in the TunaDolphin dispute of the early 1990s, although the Tuna-Dolphin reports
remained blocked by the US. 32 The upshot of Tuna-Dolphin, however, was
that the US could not refuse to import tuna on the basis that it disapproved of
the manner in which the tuna was caught, based on its environmental or
regulatory values. So interesting was this stark dilemma to the academic
mind that certain academic careers seemed to be formed in the cauldron of
Tuna-Dolphin analysis. But after 1995, with the binding nature of the dispute
resolution system, the stakes were much higher. It was no longer open to
countries to shrug off the decisions of the WTO panels, let alone those of the
new Appellate Body.
The reaction to this new legal reality appeared to lead in several
different directions in the late 1990s and beyond. First of all, from around
1998 through September 11 (after which I believe it faltered), there was the
anti-globalization movement. While some of the criticism leveled at the
WTO was incoherent, the WTO did clearly become a symbol of globalization,
and thus a focus of dissent.33 It seems obvious that this occurred because
31

See Permanent Mission of the United States, First Submission of the United States
in European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products, WT/DS291, 292 & 293 (Apr. 21, 2004). See also David
Winickoff, Sheila Jasanoff, Lawrence Busch, Robin Grove-White, Brian Wynne,
Adjudicating the GM Food Wars: Science, Risk, and Democracy in World Trade Law,
30 Yale J. Int'l L. 81 (2005).
32
See GATT, Report of the Dispute Panel , United States-Prohibition of Imports of
Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) (Feb. 22, 1982)
(unadopted); GATT, Report of the Dispute Panel, United States – Restrictions on
Imports of Tuna, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) (Aug. 16, 1991), reprinted in 30 ILM
1594 (1991) (unadopted).
33
See generally G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations
Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 Duke L.J. 829 (1995)
(describing the creation of the WTO and the new "legalism" in international trade
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WTO was now seen as law, even if far more significant decisions were being
taken by international economic bodies such as the IMF and World Bank.
The WTO gained attention because of its binding nature. Disputes, cases,
laws and rules make for visibility – and public presence. The WTO was an
instance of the transnational economic forces of big business and the stronger
countries getting their way over national resistance. So, even if it could be
argued that what the WTO was achieving was relatively modest in global
terms, it makes sense that the protesters had the WTO squarely in their sites.
For me, it was the potential of the WTO – the idea – of the WTO that
was striking. Its power over national regulation was, at least at global level,
unparalleled. In writing my own book, it seems to me that one of my own
objectives was to make the specific nature of the individual disputes—the
clash between national laws and trade principles—intelligible to a wider
audience so that more of the critics could get an idea of what they were
actually criticizing. 34 It was and still is my belief that this global trade law
should be seen as contestable.
A second strand of “trade law studies” was represented by the
“earnest analysts,” those who wrote piles of law review articles on all the
“trade and” subjects – trade and the environment, trade and labor – asking
such questions as whether the WTO could in the end be a force for good in
these areas.35 Beyond this kind of analysis lurked a more fundamental
question: what was the basis for this newly binding global law, when binding
international law is otherwise so hard to come by? Was there more to this
than just the legal arm of transnational business? In the parlance of a few
years ago, what was the legitimacy of the WTO?36

law); David A. Gantz, Failed Efforts to Initiate the "Millenium Round" in Seattle:
Lessons for Future Global Trade Negotiations, 17 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 349, 35057 (2000) (outlining some of the reasons for the first major protests against the WTO
in Seattle in 1999).
34
See Dillon, supra note 21, at preface.
35
See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Trade Law and Global Governance (Cameron May,
2002); Steve Charnovitz, The Boundaries of the WTO: Triangulating the World
Trade Organization, 96 Am. J. Int’l L.28 (2002); Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair
Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27 Cornell Int'l L.J. 459 (1994). Robert
Schaeffer, Trading Away the Planet, 15 Greenpeace, Sept.-Oct. 1990.
36
See Robert Howse, The Boundaries of the WTO: From Politics to Technocracy-and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 94
(2002); Robert Howse, The Legitimacy of the World Trade Organization, in The
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At some point, the criticism of the WTO as a symbol of globalization
led to corresponding expectations that the WTO could somehow, through the
power of trade law, present a legal response to child labor and human rights
abuses.37 I always had the impulse to point out that the WTO had no such
role, no such explicit mandate, no such subject matter jurisdiction. But real
lawyers like “law,” and for a period of several years, the WTO remained an
irresistible focus on all sides.
My impression is that this set of legitimacy questions was never really
sorted out to any satisfactory degree. Rather, the very earnest participants got
bored by their own debate. If the WTO were to be altered in any significant
way, all that could happen would be a turning back to a pre-1995-like
situation, where diplomacy predominated over law. Should the US Congress,
driven by constituency conflic ts over these issues, ever really say “enough,”
that too much sovereignty and protectionist discretion had been sacrificed to
the needs of transnational business, then such a turning back would be the
likely result. 38 A more progressive, complex, global governance — oriented
WTO plus was hardly on the cards. But the WTO simply moved forward, as it
was, from one issue and minor frisson to another, with the US Congress trying
to ensure that an evolving WTO served the multiple interests and needs of the

Legitimacy of International Organizations 355 (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo
Heiskanen eds., 2001), Robert Howse, Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty
Interpretation in International Trade Law: The Early Years of WTO Jurisprudence, in
The EU , The WTO, and NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International Trade 59
(J.H.H. Weiler ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2000); Joseph Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers
and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of
Dispute Settlement, in Efficiency, Equity, and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading
System at the Millennium 334 (Roger B. Porter, Pierre Sauve, Arvind Subramanian,
& Americo Beviglia Zampetti eds., 2001).
37
See Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far
Can We Go? 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 535 (2001). But see Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of
WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 Harv. Int'l L.J. 333, 342 (1999) (arguing that WTO
dispute resolution is authorized to directly apply only WTO law).
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U.S. Congressional distaste for the WTO dispute resolution process was expressed
by Senator Max Baucus, stating that WTO panels are "making up rules that the US
never negotiated, that Congress never approved, and I suspect, that Congress would
never approve." US DSU Proposal Receives Mixed Reactions, Bridges Wkly. Trade
News Dig., Dec. 20, 2002, at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/02-12-20/wtoinbrief.htm.
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US, even if this incidentally and correspondingly greatly disadvantaged one’s
trading partners.39
I personally got stuck at this chronological place in the debate. I
wanted to know, I still want to know, what the overall effect on human
welfare was of eliminating ever more national regulations with the potential
of restricting trade. I wanted to know why the WTO should have a binding
dispute resolution mechanism when human rights law and other branches of
international law do not—why is human rights law of all things notoriously
“fluffy,” unlawyerlike, aspirational? I realize that the question sounds naïve,
but that impression of naïveté is a function of lawyers’ preference for
minutiae, rather than any problem with the question itself.
I think the community of trade law scholars simply got tired of this
debate and moved on to a more accepting kind of insiders’ analysis. It
became far trendier to treat the Appellate Body as an established court and to
examine all disputes, whatever their subject matter, as a treasure trove of legal
principles and jurisprudential tests.40 The Appellate Body turned out to be a
reliable and respectable target of lawyerly attention.
We recently marked the tenth anniversary of the NAFTA Agreement.
NAFTA of course has triggered a varie ty of changes in the North American
trade relationship: tariffs lowered or removed, other trade related restrictions
39

A report transmitted by the Secretary of Commerce to Congress concluded that the
disputes referred to the DSB generally "have been handled expeditiously and with
professionalism" and that "WTO dispute settlement has benefited a wide range of
U.S. industries and their workers," but adds that "the United States does not agree
with the approach that WTO panels and the Appellate Body have sometimes taken in
disputes," and criticizes several specific instances of judicial lawmaking in trade
remedy cases. The report suggested some measured fine-tuning to offer "greater
member control over the dispute settlement process," and noted that though judicial
lawmaking at the WTO has become a political irritant in the US, Appellate Body
lawmaking has only marginally weakened U.S. trade remedy laws, but is operating
near its political limits. Executive Branch Strategy Regarding WTO Dispute
Settle ment Panels and the Appellate Body, Report to the Congress Transmitted by the
Secretary
of
Commerce
8-10
(Dec.
30,
2002),
available
at
http://www.ita.doc.gov/FinalDec31ReportCorrected.pdf.
40
See generally Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis, editors, Patrick Blatter,
associate editor, Does the WTO Judge Trespass His Mandate?, The Role of Judge in
International Trade Regulation: Experience and Lessons for the WTO, (University of
Michigan Press, 2003).
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eliminated, greater rights for investors. Yet, despite all this, a recent Carnegie
Endowment report indicated that the overall economic effect on the average
Mexican was a wash.41 NAFTA had not brought significantly higher levels of
employment, had not led to general prosperity, had not raised the boats of the
poor. Indeed, in the agricultural sector, the effect was dazzlingly negative.42
This lack of a measurable benefit for most people went mostly unremarked.
Perhaps the study of law in general does not encourage linking technique to
larger purposes. Maybe it is not the job of a lawyer to wonder what a
particular set of laws is designed to achieve. It does seem an amazing
abdication of responsibility, however, to ignore these implications altogether.
As with all branches of law, it is the tendency of trade lawyers to
think in terms of particular disputes. Lawyers love, or at least gravitate
towards, judicial standards applied to dispute resolution. As if of mystical
interest for its own sake, the test that decides the day in court is an object of
devotion for lawyers.
Although many might disagree with me on this, reading panel and
Appellate Body decisions is at best an acquired taste. The more sensitive
among us will flock to a field of study with some more recognizable link to
the realm of human concern. As a consequence, the specialist discourse
around trade law becomes increasingly limited to those able to follow the
hair-splitting discussions characteristic of the rulings. This is even more the
case as the “legitimacy” discussion dies away, and the WTO is increasingly
accepted for “being what it is”.
I imagine high school students still read Kafka’s The Trial.43 Perhaps
it should be required reading in law schools, as it is of far more intellectual
relevance than One L.44 Looking back on what we were meant to read The
Trial for, beyond the anti-totalitarian slant to American secondary education,
surely it was meant to indicate that we must be on guard against the
perversions of a legal system that is all detail and no significance; all process
and no explanation. This is a fairly portable lesson, and one that should
caution us in accepting the deadpan detail of trade law disputes.
41

Sandra Polaski, Jobs, Wages and Household Income, in NAFTA's Promise and
Reality
24
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2003)
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It is often said that EU law, with its complex legislative process,
elaborate separation of powers principles, and dense body of regulation, is
technocratic and off-putting. 45 I actually find EU law to be immensely poetic,
especially the decisions of the Court of Justice.46 This is particularly true in
comparison with international trade law. The ECJ hovers between context and
text, compressing historical meaning into the ultimate legal bon mot.
As for international trade law, it is rewarding if and when we
maintain an interest in the very issues that, as I have explained, seem to have
died away in the last few years. Identifying the judicial qualities of the
Appellate Body, and pondering whether it is “activist” as a court, seem to be
questions that put the cart very much before the horse.47 Perhaps taking such
questions as our focus makes WTO law appear to be pleasingly self evident,
makes trade law appear to be a regular law subject, even though we have not
yet begun to sort out such foundational matters as whether trade law should
endure in its present form at all.
Last year’s collapse of the Doha Round talks at Cancun were of
interest, in that an organized bloc of developing countries refused to repeat the
experience of the Uruguay Round, where the wealthiest countries were
essentially able to dictate the terms.48 At Cancun, it became clear that
agricultural reform, including the elimination of heavily distorting agricultural
subsidies by the US and EC, would be a precondition for any real progress.
This flurry of activity forced a revisit to buried issues of fairness and
distribution of gains, but so briefly and in such a limited way, that it would be
unjustified on this basis alone to make predictions about a new departure for
global trade law.
I can offer my own prescriptions for the future study of international
trade law, knowing full well that these recommendations will likely not be
heeded. As tempting as such an approach appears to be, I do not think that
studying WTO law, or WTO law with a twist of NAFTA, makes sense in
45

See, e.g., David A.O. Edward, What Kind of Law Does Europe Need? The Role of
Law, Lawyers and Judges in Contemporary European Integraton, 5 Colum. J. Eur. L.
1, 7-8 (1999).
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Developing Principles of Self-Restraint, 22 NW. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 353 (2002).
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Following the Cancun Setback , 8 Drake J. Agric. L. 489 (2003).
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isolation from other international institutions. We should know much more
than we do about the development potential of trade rules and principles, or
indeed the lack of such potential. Mystifying the disputes and the attendant
“jurisprudence” cannot bring us any closer to such insights. I would suggest
adopting an international economic law approach that covers the decisionmaking methodology of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank so
that the big three of international economic institutions can be seen as
working in tandem, and their collective goals can be better scrutinized. It is
the IMF and World Bank that could steer aid and investment in a manner
calculated to achieve development results.49 A serious and hard-hitting
human rights dimension would also be an essential feature of such a field of
study. On that basis and foundation, “non-discrimination in trade” might
actually have some significant wealth creation power. On its own, trade law
seems to generate an endless series of empty legal gestures.
I recognize that what I advocate is implicitly rejected by mainstream
“trade studies” in favor of a focus on “the dispute,” since that fits so
comfortably into the hegemony of the “case method” approach to legal
studies. Despite the prevalent “trade and” fatigue, human rights people
should begin to invade the inner sanctum of international trade meetings and
conferences, where, as in so many other fields, a repetitious band of “experts”
and specialists preside. Law schools and lawyers, as a product of these
schools, distrust the big ideas, the context, the great notion that inspires and
propels reform. We need to know whether we are about “constructing global
governance,” or merely “removing barriers to trade” in the name of greater
global efficiency and that rather silly anachronism, comparative advantage. If
the former, then the study of international trade law has the potential to
become a wonderful process, as students are encouraged to link trade rules to
human—yes, human--development goals.

49

For history and analysis of past and present development models of the IMF and
World Bank, see Jeremy J. Sanders, The World Bank and the IMF: Fostering Growth
in the Global Market, 9 Currents Int'l Trade L.J. 37 (2000).

